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Abstract
This article addresses an important but understudied aspect of the recent Great Recession in 
Europe: the institutional strategies political elites deployed to learn from past policy failures and 
address accountability, more specifically, truth commissions. We raise two overlapping puzzles. 
The first concerns the timing of the decision to adopt an economic truth commission: while 
Iceland established a truth commission at an early stage of the crisis, Greece and Ireland did 
so much later. What accounts for ‘early’ versus ‘delayed’ truth seekers? The second concerns 
variations in learning outcomes. Iceland’s commission paved the way for learning institutional 
lessons, but truth commissions in Greece and Ireland became overtly politicised. What accounts 
for these divergences? This article compares truth commissions in Iceland, Greece and Ireland 
and identifies two types of political learning – institutional and instrumental – related to the 
establishment of a truth commission. It argues that political elites in countries with higher pre-
crisis levels of trust in institutions and public transparency are more likely to establish economic 
truth commissions quickly; this is the ‘institutional logic’ of learning. The ‘instrumental logic’ of 
learning, in contrast, leads governments interested in apportioning blame to their predecessors to 
establish commissions at a later date, usually proximal to critical elections.
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The recent Great Recession in Europe provides an excellent avenue to explore how political 
elites use institutions to learn from policy failures. Of special relevance in this case are the 
truth commissions (TCs) established by several countries to identify the causes of their 
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economic meltdowns. Their goal was to document institutional, political and/or individual 
failures and publish reports offering guidelines for institutional, policy and regulatory 
reforms. These particular TCs constitute an institutional innovation. Their sudden appear-
ance, coupled with differences across countries, prompts numerous questions, two of which 
we seek to answer here. First, what explains the decision to set up a TC after an economic 
crisis? Is there a uniform explanation for their establishment or does this vary? Second, why 
in certain countries did political elites attempt to use TCs for political gain, while in others, 
they favoured restoring trust to state institutions over partisan considerations?
This article addresses these questions by looking at three economic TCs: the 
Icelandic Special Investigation Committee (SIC), established in 2008; the Greek 
Committee on Public Debt, established in 2015; and Ireland’s Parliamentary Banking 
Inquiry (BI), established in 2014. From the comparison, we identify two types of politi-
cal learning displayed by political elites related to the establishment of a TC. The first, 
institutional learning, applies to countries where rebuilding trust after a major eco-
nomic crisis is important for political elites: here, levels of public transparency and 
trust in institutions were already high in pre-crisis periods, and a TC appeared in the 
early stages of the crisis. The second, instrumental learning, applies to countries where 
newly elected governments had no direct involvement with the arrival or immediate 
(mis)management of the crisis. Here, TCs were only established when seen as expedi-
ent, usually before or after critical political events such as elections or International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) bailout negotiations. In effect, they were useful devices to blame 
predecessors and gain electoral spoils.
This article is divided into seven sections. The section ‘TCs, Transitional Justice and 
Economic Crises’ defines TCs and explains why the term can be used to describe the 
institutions under study. The section ‘The “Blind Spot” of Political Learning’ shows how 
the concept of political learning can help us understand the decision to adopt TCs. The 
section ‘Puzzles and Research Design’, discusses the research methodology and design, 
while the following section, ‘Alternative Explanations’ considers several alternative, 
albeit unsatisfactory, hypotheses as to why governments adopt economic TCs. The sec-
tion ‘Institutional versus Instrumental Learning’ develops a new theoretical framework to 
explain the adoption of TCs by governments at either early or late stages: institutional 
learning for early adopters and instrumental learning for late adopters. The final two sec-
tions explore each type of learning in turn, with case studies of institutional learning 
(Iceland) and instrumental learning (Ireland and Greece). The article concludes by evalu-
ating the success of these mechanisms and identifying their flaws. As will be shown, the 
instrumental approach to learning can backfire on governments, downplaying instead of 
highlighting the role their predecessors played in the crisis.
TCs, Transitional Justice and Economic Crises
Transitional justice is a framework usually associated with dealing with the past in 
post-conflict societies (Kritz, 1995). It points to the importance of learning from the 
past and explores the impact of different policies of formal acknowledgement of wrong-
doing, including prosecutions (Sikkink, 2011), TCs (Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010) and 
amnesties or partial impunity (McEvoy and Mallinder, 2012) on the quality of the 
emerging political institutions.
TCs are independent, officially sanctioned, fact-finding mechanisms tasked to investi-
gate and document patterns of past human rights violations, often following a political 
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transition from conflict to peace or from authoritarianism to democracy (see Freeman, 
2006; Hayner, 1994; Wiebelhaus-Brahm, 2010). They are usually vested with investiga-
tive powers, ranging from subpoenaing and taking testimonies from victims to overseeing 
forensic investigations. They prepare a final report with their findings and offer recom-
mendations to improve the quality of human rights. The first TCs were established in 
Latin America in an effort to shed light on clandestine patterns of crimes, such as finding 
the whereabouts of the disappeared: those persons kidnapped and secretly buried by 
authoritarian regimes (Kovras, 2017). Since then, particularly after the global prominence 
of the post-apartheid South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), TCs 
have diffused globally. While TCs have historically been associated with the study of 
violence and political change, their use has become more mainstream, used, for example, 
to analyse economic and social change, both of which have a powerful impact on citizens’ 
lives (Michalowski, 2014).
The transitional justice framework – TCs in particular – is relevant to this study for 
three reasons. First, transitional justice is conceptually based on the assumption that tran-
sitions are ‘critical junctures’ and decisions have long-term potential to determine the 
quality of the emerging democracy (Olsen et al., 2010; Sikkink, 2011). Thus, it implicitly 
considers learning from the past to be an instrument of political and institutional reform. 
The intuitive question in most ‘transitions’ is whether societies which do not deal with 
past policy failures or look for the causes of a crisis are condemned to repeat their mis-
takes, including in the economic sphere. To give a comparative example, on one hand, 
despite dealing proactively with the human rights abuses of the ‘dirty war’ (1976–1983; 
Sikkink, 2011), Argentina has not addressed the causes of its economic collapse in the 
early 2000s (Panizza, 2014). On the other hand, following the Great Depression of the 
1930s, the US Senate mandated the Pecora Commission to identify the causes of the 1929 
Wall Street Crash. In addition to analysing the preconditions, Pecora suggested innova-
tive institutional reforms, resulting in the Glass-Steagall Act; this led to the separation of 
commercial from investment banking which ultimately protected markets from a finan-
cial crisis for several decades.
Second, in the aftermath of gross human rights violations and also after economic 
meltdown, state institutions are severely weakened and state-society relations fractured. 
The examination of transitional justice in general and TCs in particular can be useful to 
determine how and why political elites deploy (or refrain from using) institutional mecha-
nisms to restore trust in the state.
Third, and most importantly, TCs and other truth recovery initiatives are mandated to 
uncover and publicly acknowledge something ‘hidden’ in the past, for example, the 
above-mentioned disappearances in Latin America. Contemporary financial crises are 
equally hidden. They are complex and technical, often occurring in distant or virtual loca-
tions, enabling only a minority of experts to understand their root causes (see Helleiner 
and Pagliari, 2011; Palan, 2006). Economic TCs, like their sister commissions in Latin 
America, have the capacity to ‘uncover’ complicated processes unseen by most citizens 
but affecting their daily lives.
TCs are recognised as establishing simplified, yet authoritative, narratives of the 
causes of crisis that can be easily understood by the general public. These backward-
looking mechanisms document patterns of political, economic or institutional failure; 
their mandate is restricted temporally, and they are assigned investigative powers. The 
economic commissions discussed here (Iceland, Ireland and Greece) exemplify this for-
mat. Table 1 summarises the composition, mandate and independence of each.
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TCs usually include experts, including judicial authorities, academics and public 
administrators; their concern is identifying broad patterns of political, legal and institu-
tional failure. The key objective of their final report is to convert these failures into policy 
recommendations. Fact-finding commissions have been mushrooming around the world; 
however, we need to distinguish between TCs and other truth recovery bodies. Otherwise 
we risk defining all such mechanisms as TCs and devaluing their unique qualities.
TCs usually differ from technical commissions or parliamentary inquiries in their inves-
tigative scope, composition and the periods under scrutiny. In the economic realm, technical 
reports ordered by politicians or independent authorities tend to focus on specific aspects of 
crises, such as the collapse of a single bank or the role of regulators. For example, the UK 
Financial Services Authority (FSA, 2008, 2011) prepared reports on the Northern Rock and 
the Royal Bank of Scotland fiascos. As the mandate and scope of these investigations 
remained narrow and particular, they cannot be considered TCs. The ‘Turner Review’, 
tasked to identify flaws in the UK banking system, had a more expansive target of investiga-
tion (FSA, 2009). Still, it was primarily a ‘review’ of existing regulatory practices, not a 
broader narrative of what went wrong. The truth recovery initiatives under scrutiny in this 
article were asked to critique the established institutional framework, hence their categori-
sation as TCs. Also common to the three cases is the (theoretical) authority vested in them 
by national parliaments, another factor separating TCs from other report-producing bodies 
serving similar functions (Hayner, 1994: 604).
The ‘Blind Spot’ of Political Learning
Political learning has been studied by many scholars in many ways, some considering 
individuals and others focusing on institutions (Bermeo, 1992; Mishler and Rose, 2007; 
Soss, 1999). For Nancy Bermeo (1992), political learning is a process whereby beliefs 
and tactics are modified following ‘severe crises, frustrations, and dramatic changes in 
environment’ (p. 274). Such events force re-evaluation of the ideas informing past actions.
Political economists have already explored learning processes after major crises. Many 
have convincingly illustrated how an economic meltdown can challenge economic ortho-
doxy and engender new ideas in policymaking (Blyth, 2001; Chwieroth, 2010; Culpepper, 
2008; Hall, 1986). And many studies consider the long-term consequences of ideational 
shifts, for example, attitudes to former political regimes. However, although it is now com-
mon wisdom that crises stimulate political learning, we have limited knowledge of the 
institutional mechanisms guiding this process.
Some say that despite the impact of crises, opportunities for learning and reform are 
fewer than often thought (Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003). Arjen Boin et al. (2008) contend that 
Table 1. Composition of TCs in Iceland, Greece and Ireland.
State Mandate Composition Level of independence
Iceland Institutional and individual 
causes of meltdown
Ombudsman, judge; 
academic
Appointed by parliament/
independent
Greece Audit debt Politicians; experts; 
members of civil society
Appointed by president of 
parliament/controlled by 
government
Ireland Collapse of banks; policy 
conditions leading to same
Politicians; expert 
witnesses
All-party parliamentary 
committee
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while one would expect ‘political learning to get to the heart of “what went wrong” and 
ensure that “the facts” become available’ to inform future policy decisions, such an out-
come is by no means ‘the norm’ (pp. 14–15). They suggest investigations into crises 
rarely produce clear lessons, with some notable exceptions, such as the Hillsborough 
stadium disaster or the unsafe convictions of the ‘Birmingham six’ in the United Kingdom. 
Indeed, they say such investigative mechanisms are often themselves sites of contestation 
and politicised wrangling.
Such argumentation draws a strict dividing line in the debate on political learning: 
either crises provide valuable opportunities to learn lessons from past mistakes or their 
potential to drive such processes is limited. But is it not also possible that different types 
of learning occur during crises, and that these are shaped, at least partially, by the institu-
tional mechanisms established to drive the process? In effect, studying the institutional 
mechanisms set up to deal with the crisis can reveal a lot about whether and how political 
elites learn from the past and what type of lessons they glean from past policy failure. 
This is something the literature on political learning has not adequately explored.
Bermeo offers a useful way to examine these themes. Crises, as she puts it:
force people to re-evaluate the ideas that they have used as guides to action in the past, failures 
in economic policy act as turning points that frequently lead to changes in the priorities, tactics 
and strategies deployed by a ‘critical mass’ of learners (Bermeo, 1992: 276; emphasis added).
This allows us to address a blind spot in the literature, the ‘politics’ of political learning: 
whether and to what extent tactical manoeuvrings are driven by genuine imperatives of 
lesson learning (institutional learning) or by political considerations (instrumental learn-
ing), or occasionally both.
Political learning is neither homogeneous nor linear. It takes different trajectories, 
shaped by endogenous political realities, including electoral, ideological and symbolic 
politics. Crises may provide opportunities for reform. But they are also ripe moments for 
apportioning blame or seeking electoral gains (Boin et al., 2008; Boin and ‘t Hart, 2003). 
In the latter instance, learning is driven (or thwarted) by political actors’ need to legiti-
mise favourable discourses (or contest hegemonic narratives) about the origins of crisis: 
in other words, they play the blame game (Hood, 2010).
A final caveat is how to conceptualise learning. Scholars have explored different levels 
of learning, including but not limited to ideas, policies and institutions. In this article, we 
focus on the latter, exploring the institutional mechanisms that convert past failures into 
lessons (for a more detailed operationalisation, see below). Given the temporal proximity of 
the economic crises and the commissions under investigation, it is impossible to trace their 
full impact on policy or to define major ideational shifts. Although we acknowledge that the 
three levels of learning occasionally overlap, we focus on institutions, believing that 
the institutional mechanics of learning can reveal a great deal about the other two by illumi-
nating the political drivers shaping policy responses.
Puzzles and Research Design
To understand the institutional strategies political elites deploy to deal with accountability 
and learning from crises, we address two overlapping, puzzling questions. The first con-
cerns the timing of the decision to adopt an economic TC: while Iceland established a TC 
at an early stage of the crisis, Greece and Ireland did so much later. What accounts for 
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‘early’ versus ‘delayed’ truth seekers? The second concerns variations in learning out-
comes. Iceland’s commission paved the way for learning institutional lessons, but TCs in 
Greece and Ireland became overtly politicised. What accounts for these divergences?
Our questions call for a comparative research design (Lijphart, 1971). While difficult 
to generalise conclusions from single-case studies, large-n quantitative analyses are 
frequently based on ‘conceptual stretching’ (Sartori, 1970). Small-n comparisons inspire 
more confidence in the accurate measurement of the chosen concepts, a key element in 
theory development (George and Bennett, 2005). We draw on ‘comparable cases’ that are 
puzzling in their outcomes (Lijphart, 1971; Przeworski and Teune, 1970). More precisely, 
we compare cases with similar background conditions but slightly different policy 
responses. To understand the decision to adopt TCs and the timing, we carry out process 
tracing for our three case studies based on qualitative interviews with politicians and 
policy-makers who established or participated in the commissions and on the archived 
proceedings of the TCs (George and Bennett, 2005).1 We draw extensively on official 
publications of the commissions, including interim or final reports, minutes from their 
meetings, press releases and witness statements to the TCs by current and former political 
leaders in the chosen countries, as the most reliable sources to understand both the ration-
ale for their original adoption and the scope of their investigation. This is triangulated 
with references to mainstream national newspapers – excluding tabloids – where appro-
priate. Our objective is to trace the learning process by focusing on the reports of the 
commissions, hence the focus on their proceedings. Such evidence includes the testimony 
of key political figures in power during the crises, as well as those in opposition who won 
subsequent critical elections. This allows us to observe whether, and to what extent, poli-
ticians sought to use the TCs instrumentally as a partisan blame game or as a non-partisan 
tool for learning lessons.
We acknowledge that the small number of cases increases the potential for the problem 
of ‘too few cases, too many variables’ (Collier, 1993). This is not determined by our 
research design but by the fact that the universe of cases is small. Economic TCs are rela-
tively novel. Hence, we are analysing a fluid and emerging phenomenon which remains 
open to future refinement of our hypotheses with the emergence of new cases. To mini-
mise the impact of this methodological reality, we compare three of the most prominent 
cases while ruling out several alternative explanatory hypotheses.
Alternative Explanations
The type of crisis may explain why an economic TC is set up. Greece had a debt crisis, 
while Iceland and Ireland had banking crises, possibly making it easier for the former to 
look for individual culprits and for the latter to evade responsibility by pointing to ‘reck-
less’ bankers. This hypothesis does not hold, as all three countries established TCs.
Structural and political explanations might be more useful. Perhaps it is not solely 
the type or depth of crisis but its political management that matters. As Table 2 shows, 
in countries where leaders negotiated IMF programmes, the consequences of the crisis 
were mitigated or spread over a longer period. However, in countries suffering bank-
ing-sector collapses before emergency financing was agreed upon, the popular pres-
sure to establish a TC to ascertain the causes is evident, as in Iceland. But this fails to 
account for the decision of countries already in IMF programmes to adopt TCs, such 
as Greece and Ireland. Clearly, the situation is complicated, and a single explanation 
is inadequate.
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Institutional vs. Instrumental Learning
A common thread linking all countries experiencing economic crises is the challenge to 
political and judicial institutions. Economic shocks raise questions about accountability, 
responsibility and learning from policy failures. Questions such as ‘whose fault was it?’, 
‘what went wrong?’ or ‘how did our institutions not prevent the disaster?’ are commonly 
asked. The response of political elites and institutions varies according to the expectations 
of the public in different countries.
We hypothesise that political leaders in countries with high pre-crisis levels of trust in 
institutions, such as Iceland, will be more responsive to popular calls for accountability 
(Table 3). An institutional logic will drive learning from policy failures, largely indepen-
dently of political considerations or ideology. Here, TCs are useful mechanisms to convert 
failures into lessons to prevent future crises. The logic of institutional learning and the need 
to rebuild trust in institutions are expressed by elites across the political spectrum. Thus, we 
expect an economic TC to be established early in the crisis, irrespective of the ideological 
orientation or the degree of culpability of the incumbent government. Similarly, we expect 
cross-party support for such an endeavour. Institutional learning is premised on securing the 
long-term legitimacy of the democratic regime and trumps short-term party-political consid-
erations. Therefore, political elites will establish a TC even if the final report risks putting 
political blame on them, not least because the electoral and legitimacy cost of inaction would 
be much higher. Responsiveness to public calls for accountability and learning from one’s 
own policy failures to strengthen institutions are twin features of institutional learning.
This hypothesis is supported by empirical evidence. Table 4 summarises average 
levels of trust in central political institutions (national parliament, government and judici-
ary) across our cases in the five pre-crisis years, defined here as the signing of an IMF 
programme. To measure perceptions of public transparency, we consider the average per-
ception of corruption (in parliament and the judiciary) for the same periods, with the most 
common indicators and sources (Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and Corruption 
Table 2. Depth of Crisis (Peak to Trough) and Number of Years in Recession.
Peak year Trough year Peak GDP Trough GDP Difference Difference (%)
Iceland 2007 2009 21,295 12,887 8,408 39
Greece 2008 2013 354,461 239,862 114,559 32
Ireland 2008 2010 274,919 221,357 53,562 19
GDP: gross domestic product.
Table 3. Two Types of Learning after Crisis.
Type of learning Objectives Focus Timing
Institutional learning Rebuild trust/legitimacy
Protect institutions in the 
future
Institutional failure Early after crisis
Instrumental learning Create favourable political 
narrative
Blame game
Electoral gains
Policymaking failure After critical election 
(new parties and demise 
of dominant parties)
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Perception Index) used to measure trust and transparency. While sometimes contentious, 
these metrics are useful for mapping political trends. A glance at the table shows that 
Iceland is an outlier, with considerably higher levels of trust and transparency. In this 
case, high public expectations of ascertaining responsibility for past failure locked politi-
cal leaders into a logic of institutional learning; this explains why Iceland’s political elites 
established a commission almost immediately and why it was the incumbent government 
which did so.
This does not explain the decision to adopt a TC in Greece and Ireland. Here, we see a 
second type of learning, instrumental learning. In both countries, there is a minimum 
level of trust in public institutions but it is insufficient to lead to the outcome seen in 
Iceland. Instead, TCs emerged as a result of political elites’ decision to play the blame 
game, with the post-crisis government hoping to create authoritative public (and finger-
pointing) narratives of the causes of the crisis to suit its own interests. Learning from the 
past, then, is instrumental, geared towards ideological and policymaking critiques of 
previous governments, not a bid to highlight institutional failures. Simply stated, such 
TCs are a convenient mechanism to instrumentally use past policy failures to perpetuate 
the new governing party’s discourse of blame, and the timing of their adoption depends 
on a critical election leading to the demise of one party and the rise to power of another.
Two caveats are in order. First, there is a relative dearth of knowledge of the operation-
alisation of the concept of learning. Learning means different things to different scholars. 
To explain what learning entails in the contexts of TCs and to support our theoretical 
framework with observable empirical phenomena, we establish three sets of indicators to 
determine the instrumental or institutional pathway of learning, focusing on the three key 
stages in the life of TCs: the ‘decision to adopt’, the ‘mandate’ and the ‘report’.
The decision to adopt is crucial, with the potential to explain the timing and political 
dynamics that paved the way for the establishment of the commission in the first instance. 
When a commission is set up or whether there is cross-party consensus can reveal a lot 
about the instrumental or institutional logic behind it. As the existing literature on TCs 
explains, the specific mandate is critical in shaping the boundaries of learning (Chapman 
and Ball, 2001). What is the temporal scope of the investigation? Which issues are included 
or sidelined from its mandate? Does it focus narrowly on bad decision-making of individu-
als or on broader patterns of institutional failure? What is its level of independence from 
power-holders? These critical questions shape the type of learning. Finally, the afterlife of 
the commission is pivotal. Does the TC publish a report, and if it does, what type of recom-
mendations does it offer? More importantly, is there a follow-up to implement the recom-
mendations or not? These observable indicators can determine whether a particular 
commission is driven by institutional or instrumental learning (Table 5).
Table 4. Average Pre-Crisis Levels of Trust in Institutions (Judiciary, Parliament and 
Government) and Public Transparency (Perception of Corruption in Judiciary and Parliament).
Country Average trust (%) Average CPI (1–10)
Greece 49.10 4.36
Iceland 59.70 9.38
Ireland 40.80 7.60
CPI: Corruption Perception Index; IMF: International Monetary Fund.
Period under investigation 5 years prior to the signing of the IMF programme.
Sources: Eurobarometer, European Social Survey and Corruption Perception Index (Transparency International).
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Second, the two types of learning are not mutually exclusive; as will be seen, the two 
logics often co-exist, creating a dynamic explanatory framework. In effect, it is not exclu-
sively the logic of principles that guides political elites to follow the institutional learning 
pathway; rather, the institutional framework raises the electoral cost of inertia or partisan-
ship. Equally, it may not be avarice alone that leads new governments to follow an instru-
mental pathway, especially as the instrumental approach often delivers sub-optimal 
outcomes for them, as our case studies demonstrate.
Institutional Learning
Iceland’s Special Investigation Commission
In October 2008, Iceland’s three major banks collapsed within a week, taking 97% of the 
country’s banking system with them: estimated at US$180 billion, this was the third larg-
est corporate bankruptcy on record (Johnsen, 2014). The crash ended an unprecedented 
period of growth, facilitated by cheap credit and exponential banking-sector growth, from 
174% of gross domestic product (GDP) at the end of 2003 to about 1000% when it unrav-
elled in 2008 (Benediktsdottir et al., 2011). While the nation was still in shock, and before 
any protest demands arose, Icelandic political elites moved quickly and pre-emptively, 
announcing that the causes of the crash would be investigated. Iceland’s Special 
Investigation Commission (SIC; henceforth also TC) was established, the first of its kind 
in Europe. The process paving the way for the commission, its mandate and scope were 
all shaped by the institutional logic of learning.
The decision to establish this TC was made by the incumbent government, led by the 
right-wing Independence Party (IP). IP had held power for 18 consecutive years and was 
perceived responsible for the creation and (mis)management of the crisis. The only rea-
son for political elites to set up mechanisms that could potentially incriminate them was 
the fear that the political costs of inaction or a cover up might be even greater. As noted 
above, this is arguably more common in countries with established cultures of transpar-
ency, accountability and trust in institutions. Guided by this logic, only 3 days after the 
banking-sector collapse, Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced that an investigative 
mechanism would be established to ‘be clear what happened and why’ (Morgunbladid, 12 
Table 5. Types of Learning and Truth Commissions.
Steps Observable indicators
Decision to adopt Political timing of adoption
Political support
Mandate Temporal scope
Investigative powers
Scope of investigations
Issues included
Level of independence from politicians
Focus on patterns of institutional flaws
Final report Publication of report
Scope of recommendations
Follow-up activities to act on recommendations
Cross-party support for recommendations
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October 2008: 10–11). The most senior political advisor to the leader of the Social 
Democratic Alliance (IP’s coalition partner) said, ‘It was just the right thing to do; we 
owed the nation an explanation of what went wrong and what needed to be fixed’ (inter-
view, Kristrún Heimisdóttir, Reykjavik, 26 May 2015). Notably, the commission had 
cross-party consensus, highlighting the priority of reinstating the legitimacy of the politi-
cal system. An opposition leader argued, ‘Geir Haarde showed considerable maturity and 
realised this needed to be done. The events were of such magnitude that there would 
never be any agreement or reconciliation unless they were thoroughly investigated’ (inter-
view, Steingrímur J. Sigfusson, leader, Left-Green Movement (LGM), Reykjavik, 2 
December 2015).
The Icelandic TC’s design and mandate illustrate the institutional logic of learning. 
For one thing, the appointed commissioners reflect the key investigative institutions of 
the country: a Supreme Court Judge, the Parliamentary Ombudsman and an Icelandic-
born Yale economist with banking expertise. According to the Speaker of Parliament, a 
member of IP who tabled the bill establishing the TC, it was thought necessary that it be 
headed by ‘irreproachable professionals that were outside of the daily grind of politics’ 
(interview, Sturla Böðvarsson, Reykjavik, 1 December 2015). Efforts were also made to 
insulate the commission from party politics and reinforce its independence to ensure 
genuine lesson learning.
As the TC’s primary objective was to reinstate trust in state institutions fractured by 
the crisis, its mandate and scope were correspondingly broad, namely, to:
[S]eek the truth behind the events leading to, and the causes of, the downfall of the Icelandic 
banks in October 2008, and related events, [to] assess whether mistakes or negligence occurred 
in the course of the implementation of the laws and other rules regulating and providing for 
control of the Icelandic financial sector [and to determine] what persons may be responsible 
(Althingi, 2008).
Political leaders understood its open-ended scope to be central in regaining citizens’ trust. 
According to LGM’s leader and later Minister of Finance, ‘politicians realised that this 
(the SIC) could not be a compromise; this needed to be for real – otherwise there would 
be no trust’ (interview, Steingrimur J. Sigfusson, Reykjavik, 2 December 2015).
To carry out the demanding investigative task, the commissioners were given excep-
tional investigative powers, including but not limited to subpoenaing witnesses, seizing 
evidence and searching premises. Obstructing the investigation was punishable by up to 
2 years’ imprisonment. Ultimately, the TC interviewed 147 witnesses.
To increase the potential for learning, the proceedings took place behind closed doors, 
and witnesses were given guarantees that statements made to the commission could not 
be used against them before any courts. This was to make participants feel comfortable 
enough to share their knowledge and at the same time to ‘avoid rehearsed, standardised 
responses that are designed for media headlines and shifting responsibility on to others’ 
(anonymous interview, SIC researcher, Reykjavik, 30 November 2015). In some cases, 
when the microphones were turned off and the official interview was over, witnesses were 
encouraged to talk ‘off the record’. In short, identifying failures and learning from them 
seems to have been the genuine guiding principle.
Finally, the institutional logic of learning is evidenced in the follow-up activities. In 
response to the commission’s report, the new left-wing government appointed a special 
working group of legal and public administration academics; this group made further 
recommendations on how the cabinet and individual governmental institutions should 
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respond (Forsaetisraduneytid, 2010). Over and above the executive’s initial response, 
Parliament established a cross-party parliamentary committee to ‘draw lessons from the 
SIC report and point to ways for reform’. In September 2010, 5 months after the commis-
sion delivered its findings, the all-party committee published a 265-page report distilling 
the findings and noting the lessons to be learned. Based on this report, Parliament unani-
mously passed a resolution setting out a legislative reform agenda. ‘It is important that the 
SIC report continues to be a guiding light’, it said. Furthermore, ‘it is important that 
everyone looks critically at their own actions and uses the opportunity that the report 
offers to improve society’ (Althingi, 2010).
The Icelandic TC is the only mechanism in our cases to be guided by the institutional 
logic of learning and honouring the need to rebuild the trust of the public in institutions. 
In sharp contrast to the other two examples, it was swiftly established, largely independ-
ent and legitimised by ongoing cross-party consensus.
Instrumental Learning
Greece’s Debt Audit Committee
The economic crisis radically restructured Greece’s political system (Kalyvas, 2015; 
Kovras and Loizides, 2014; Pappas, 2014). Support for the dominant parties, socialist 
PASOK and conservative New Democracy (ND), nosedived. Political polarisation was 
reflected in violent street protests, riots and the electoral rise of the far right (Ellinas, 
2013; Ellinas and Lamprianou, 2014). The most important political development was the 
transformation of the Coalition of the Radical Left (SYRIZA) from a fringe party into a 
dominant one. The creation of Greece’s TC reflects SYRIZA’s rise, lending credence to 
our proposed theoretical framework of learning.
Despite deep recession, skyrocketing unemployment, vocal calls for accountability 
and violent street protests during the first 4 years of the crisis (2010–2014), attempts to 
investigate the causes were blocked by the dominant parties amid the pressing need to 
implement a harsh austerity programme. During these years, ND and PASOK, seen as 
responsible for creating the exorbitant Greek debt, became coalition partners, with little 
incentive to investigate their own policy failures. However, SYRIZA was keen to appor-
tion blame to ND and PASOK and create a new (politically favourable) narrative to bol-
ster its legitimacy. Accordingly, 3 months after gaining power (April 2015), SYRIZA 
established a debt audit committee (henceforth the TC).
Such a move is not unique to Greece. Many leaders create mechanisms to settle old 
scores against competing political elites. What is exceptional in the Greek case is its 
extension of the blame game to include external actors, by challenging the legitimacy of 
Greek debt and seeking to negotiate a new programme with its creditors. SYRIZA’s logic 
is best expressed by former Speaker of Parliament Zoe Konstantopoulou, the politician 
who created the TC:
The current government is the first in decades that did not contribute to the creation of the public 
debt … [T]he government is legitimised to use all available tools and arguments in order to 
challenge and write off the debt, or at least to stop repaying it for so long as it threatens the 
survival and the civil and economic rights of the Greek people.
The instrumental drive of the commission is evident in its (ideological) origins. According 
to a leading member of the commission, it emphasised the international systemic causes 
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of the crisis, such as the external conditionality imposed by the creditors and its impact on 
national sovereignty, and played up the human rights of the Greek people (interview, 
London, 12 December 2015).
In short, Greek ideological instrumentalism was expressed in the effort to establish a nar-
rative supporting the view that since the debt was created by systemic international influ-
ences, it was illegal. If this narrative were established, it could be used as leverage in ongoing 
negotiations with creditors to forgive the debt. To this end, the commission was mandated to:
[G]ather all information relevant to the emergence and disproportionate increase in public debt, 
and to subject the data to scientific scrutiny in order to determine which part of the debt can be 
identified as illegitimate and illegal, odious or unsustainable, during the bailout period, from 
May 2010 to January 2015 as well as in the preceding years (Greek Debt Committee, 2015).
The Greek TC was established in April 2015, shortly after SYRIZA’s victory, as a special 
independent commission of Parliament. Its opening session was a highly visible event 
addressed by the President of the Republic and attended by the Prime Minister. In sharp 
contrast to other TCs staffed by experts or politicians, the Greek commission included 
anyone who might be interested, from international civil society organisations to a folk 
singer. A key feature was its exclusive focus on the public debt and its exclusion of 
broader issues of domestic institutional failure. The narrow temporal scope, the ‘bailout’ 
period (2010–2015), is equally noteworthy. The Greek problem was framed as one cre-
ated after the imposition of external conditionality in 2010, thereby excluding from scru-
tiny any endogenous institutional failures (i.e. corruption, tax evasion and party patronage) 
contributing to the debt in preceding decades.
Guided by this instrumental logic, the TC became a political tool to hit two targets at 
once. First, it was intended to strengthen the position of the Greek government in renego-
tiating the terms of previous Troika (IMF-EU-ECB) programmes. It had a predetermined 
conclusion, evident in its slogan: ‘Audit the debt, write it off’. As the lead expert of the 
commission, Eric Toussaint, unambiguously stated, it could:
arm the Greek government with legal arguments on the matter of partial debt abolition during 
the negotiations in relation to this matter … we will determine which part of the debt can be 
qualified as illegitimate, illegal, odious, or unsustainable (cited in Papagiannis, 2015).
Auditing Greek public debt over three decades was a Herculean task. Nevertheless, the 
commission published its preliminary findings 2 months (June 2015) after its first meet-
ing and only 2 weeks before the Greek government called a referendum on the terms of 
the new Troika programme. The timing highlights its politicised role. Not surprisingly, 
given the TC’s ideological origins, the preliminary report concluded Greece was ‘a victim 
of an attack premeditated and organised by the IMF, the ECB and the European 
Commission’ (Greek Debt Committee, 2015: 2).
Second, the commission took aim at opposing domestic political elites. Although the 
debt was a ‘premeditated’ international plan, the report found ‘Greek authorities con-
spired’ to protect domestic and international financial institutions (Greek Debt Committee, 
2015: 1). Greek politicians deemed responsible were not framed as incompetent or reck-
less policymakers but as conspirators in a consortium of foreign interests. This over-
lapped with a broader political narrative in which the government was (or should be) the 
guardian of national sovereignty. The leader of the populist right independent Greeks 
(ANEL), SYRIZA’s junior coalition partner, argued:
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Certain politicians refrain from attending this commission, and most of them participated in 
(previous) governments that surrendered the country and its national sovereignty over the past 
few years. Was this unintentional or on purpose? The commission will prove that some of them 
benefitted from this policy (Greek Truth Committee Session, 5 April 2015).
Paradoxically, although Greece faced predominantly a domestic public debt problem and 
had most to learn from illuminating well-entrenched endogenous institutional flaws, the 
TC virtually ignored these. By limiting its analytical gaze to systemic and external fail-
ures, it forestalled lessons useful for domestic reforms. Endemic problems such as cor-
ruption were either sidelined or framed as externally driven.
The abrupt termination of the Greek TC best illustrates its instrumental nature. Within 
weeks of SYRIZA’s signing of a new Troika programme, in July 2015, the party withdrew 
its support from the TC. It did not even get to publish a final report.2 After this volte face, 
the TC was irrelevant; in fact, continuing the investigation might have been perilous for 
SYRIZA. Several MPs perceived the leadership’s decision to agree to a new Troika pro-
gramme in the summer of 2015 as capitulation. This led to a wave of MP defections, 
trimming the party’s power to pass bills necessary to receive the new loans. These bills 
passed with the support of opposition parties, making it impossible for the government to 
settle scores with the opposition while simultaneously depending on them. Moreover, any 
ongoing investigative mechanism could backfire; for example, it might highlight the mis-
management of the negotiations and the adverse impact of SYRIZA’s economic policy 
while in power, including the imposition of capital controls. For instance, members of the 
committee published an additional report showing the illegality of the memorandum 
signed by SYRIZA in July 2015. A leading figure of the commission is adamant: ‘The 
continuation of the truth commission would have exposed the role of the government’ 
(interview, London, 12 December 2015).
Ireland’s Banking Inquiry (BI) Commission
Irish attempts to learn lessons from its banking crisis were significantly delayed, but 
before entering the EU/IMF programme in November 2010, the incumbent government 
began investigating the crisis. Its investigations produced three technocratic reports on 
banking and regulatory failures (Oireachtas, 2010a, 2010b) and the failure of policy-
makers to assess risks (Oireachtas, 2011). Such an approach, although potentially illumi-
nating, was at odds with fuller lesson learning. It was not until after a critical election that 
a new government established a Banking Inquiry (henceforth the TC) to examine the 
factors leading to the Irish collapse from 1992 onwards.
The Irish TC took an instrumental approach to lesson learning. As in Greece, the eco-
nomic crisis ruptured the party system. The dominant party, the centre-right Fianna Fáil 
(FF), was relegated to third place for the first time in its history (Hutcheson, 2011). In 
2011, it was replaced by a coalition of the centre-right/conservative Fine Gael (FG) and 
social-democratic/centrist Irish Labour (Labour, 2011). This change in government 
spurred politicised attempts to establish accountability.
Following the election, proposals to strengthen the powers of parliamentary inquiries 
were advanced as part of the government’s coalition programme, requiring approval in a 
referendum. In a pre-emptive move, the coalition stated that the TC would begin once 
such powers were acquired (although the original plans to increase powers of investiga-
tion were unconnected to the crisis). The referendum in October 2011 was narrowly 
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defeated. This stymied the government which had hoped to use the new powers to plan a 
‘lengthy and detailed embarrassment of Fianna Fáil’s stewardship of economic and bank-
ing matters’ (Leahy, 2013).
Nevertheless, a TC was established by statute in late 2014, comprising politicians from 
all parties and independents (Oireachtas, 2015). Despite the ostensible motivation of 
truth-seeking, it displayed a combination of instrumental learning and adversarial poli-
tics, quickly undermining its credibility. For example, the government insisted on adding 
two of its parliamentarians to the committee to ensure a majority, enabling it to set the 
terms of reference – although the TC itself was technically independent.
The TC heard testimony from current and former Prime Ministers, civil servants, 
bankers and economists. Calling on key parliamentary figures to testify was part of an 
instrumental approach to learning and highlighted the ongoing antagonism between poli-
ticians. Members of the FF-led government, which presided over the initial Troika pro-
gramme, understandably stressed their achievements before the crisis. Former FF Prime 
Minister, Brian Cowen (also a Finance Minister) mentioned the huge reductions in debt-
to-GDP ratios during his tenure; he further argued there was no indication in any of the 
advice he received that Ireland was headed for catastrophe (Brian Cowen, BI: Witness 
Statement, 2 July 2015).
For his part, his predecessor, Bertie Ahern (BI: Witness Statement, 16 July 2015), 
expressed sorrow that the crisis occurred but claimed his governments had been fiscally 
responsible:
Those who say we squandered the boom forget that in my time as Taoiseach we actually recorded 
budget surpluses in 10 of our 11 budgets … As a result, Ireland paid over a billion euro less 
every year in interest payments.
When questioned more closely, Ahern (BI: Evidence, 16 July 2015) admitted 2008 levels 
of spending were too high but contended that had he listened to the opposition, he would 
have ‘spent three times more’. The implication was that any party in power would have 
had similar results – thus, by this logic, neither he nor his party was responsible for the 
crisis.
Those representing the coalition government (FG and Labour) behaved in a similar 
fashion, highlighting their pre-crash achievements and placing the blame for domestic 
failures at the door of FF-led administrations. Deputy Prime Minister Joan Burton (BI: 
Witness Statement, 23 July 2015; Labour) claimed the previous government was largely 
at fault, stressing her own role in warning against its policies:
[A] series of catastrophic economic policy decisions by the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrat 
Government created a huge distortion in the structure of the Irish economy … I warned time and 
again against the property–based tax breaks fuelling this bubble … Those responsible were the 
Fianna Fail led Government, the boards of the banks, the Central Bank and the Financial 
Regulator.
But this approach backfired. When the Labour Party’s policies in opposition were 
questioned at the TC, it transpired it had also suggested reducing taxes. Indeed, before 
the 2007 election, it also agreed on a joint platform with FG, advocating public spend-
ing increases. When this was put to FG leader Enda Kenny (BI: Evidence, 23 July 
2015), he denied FG was anything like FF, referencing his party’s emphasis on 
competitiveness:
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You make the point that, you know, we were advocating even for more public spending. Well, 
far from that, because a central focus of our opposition to Government was the massive waste 
and the inefficiency. 
Kenny also claimed FG’s projections were based on figures from the Department of 
Finance or Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) – the same defence used by 
Ahern and Cowen. This shows the potentially counter-productive nature of the Irish 
approach. As independent parliamentarian Shane Ross (2015; an expert on banking) 
argued, ‘The conclusion is awkward. If Fine Gael swallowed the line from the ESRI and 
the Department of Finance, does that not let Fianna Fail off the hook?’ Even Kenny’s fel-
low party members who were on the TC grilled him and the Employment Minister over 
their policies in opposition. Some had voted against Kenny in a leadership challenge in 
2010, and it has been suggested that they were only available for TC duties because they 
had no cabinet responsibilities (Enda Kenny and Richard Bruton, BI: Evidence, 23 July 
2015). In other words, the instrumental nature of the TC went beyond fighting between 
different parties to encompass intra-party squabbles.
The Irish electoral system may help explain the fate of the country’s TC. The propor-
tional representation by single transferable vote (PR-STV) system means electors vote for 
personalities, not parties (Kirby and Murphy, 2011), meaning members of the governing 
parties could use the TC to challenge the government at no necessary electoral cost to 
themselves. Thus, while the TC was a classic attempt at instrumental learning, its adver-
sarial nature stopped it from becoming a simple witch-hunt of the previous government. 
The final report further supports our hypothesis of political culpability. While the coali-
tion government attempted to use the TC instrumentally, the TC’s report shared responsi-
bility among the parties:
All the main political parties, whether in opposition or in government, advocated pro-cyclical 
fiscal policies, including increasing expenditure and reducing taxation, in the years leading up 
to the crisis, as evidenced by their election manifestos in the 2002 general election and, 
especially, the 2007 general election (Oireachtas, 2016: vol. 1, p. 13).
Its recommendations vis-à-vis government included reforming the management of trans-
action-based taxes and providing parliamentarians with ‘training and support in technical 
content if they do not already possess the required skill set’ (Oireachtas, 2016: vol. 1, p. 
14), sparing any single party or politician from censure. Even a report written by one of 
the independent members, while most critical of the FF-led government, allocates blame 
across the political establishment, reckless bankers and the ‘non-opposition’ rather than 
apportioning all the blame to the government presiding over the slide into crisis (Higgins, 
2016). In the Irish case, then, the attempt to use a TC instrumentally backfired on those 
who sought to profit from it politically.
Conclusion: TCs and Omissions
To relieve economic stress, most economists focus on forward-looking policies to stimu-
late economic recovery. This study of three European countries, however, shows how 
difficult it is for politicians to resist delving into past policy failures. Under certain condi-
tions, this can be beneficial. By shedding light on the causes of the 1929 crash, the Pecora 
Commission was able to recommend a number of institutional reforms that protected the 
US economy from another major crisis for decades. If they are properly designed, TCs 
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have the potential to convert past policy failures into institutional lessons that could pro-
tect national economies from past failures.
Yet by seeking to understand what went wrong and to learn from past mistakes, a state 
accepts (tacitly at least) a role for itself in preventing future crises. This, in turn, implies new 
and innovative or additional forms of regulation in the spheres of capital and economic 
development, with obvious implications for the realms of taxation, regulation and state-led 
economic planning. Such as, for example, how to avoid pro-cyclical policies which can fuel 
the speculative ‘bubbles’ affecting the three case studies. How this can be done in an era of 
transnational capital flows has been the subject of considerable debate (see, for example, 
Helleiner, 2015; Piketty, 2014), and proposing solutions is beyond the scope of this article.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that the challenges faced by states are not merely 
economic – they are also inherently political. Those favouring a greater role for the state 
in economic and capital regulation may find themselves increasingly at odds with popu-
list movements, nativist in outlook, which see more government as part of the problem 
(Canovan, 1999; Tope et al., 2015). The simplified narratives provided by TCs may strug-
gle to compete with the even more simplified arguments of populists who seek to refash-
ion the system in their own image, rather than refresh and reform it.
TCs should not automatically be viewed as universally positive mechanisms. They can 
be used instrumentally, as in Greece and Ireland, for party-political purposes; unfortu-
nately, these can trim the perceived legitimacy of the existing political process and fuel 
the nativist and populist impulses which threaten the global and globalised economic 
system. That being said, the existence of an established culture of public transparency and 
pre-crisis trust in political institutions, as in Iceland, can lock political actors into a policy 
of delving into the past; in such cases, efforts to abstain or to cover up responsibility could 
be electorally costly. This type of broad political consensus on the need to scrutinise past 
policy failures guides institutional learning.
In our analysis of three different economic TCs, we have identified what we could 
term a learning paradox: although societies with weaker cultures of transparency could 
benefit most from learning institutional lessons from crises, institutional learning is most 
difficult in those particular countries. We also find tensions between political learning 
and realpolitik. The stated objective of TCs is to learn from past policy failures. Yet once 
they start highlighting complicated aspects of the truth, those most useful for lesson learn-
ing, they are frequently stymied by politicians interested in a simplified narrative which 
excludes inconvenient truths, as in Greece and Ireland. Contemporary financial crises are 
complex phenomena with technical, institutional, regulatory and individual decision-
making flaws. Converting a complicated phenomenon into a simplified narrative is both 
the virtue and the vice of a TC – akin to truth recovery mechanisms. Commissioners are 
tasked with converting complex processes into a publicly accessible narrative while 
offering recommendations to prevent future disasters, the essence of political learning. 
However, because they have the ability to create meta-narratives about the crisis, TCs 
become ideal instruments of symbolic politics, or realpolitik, for politicians seeking to 
establish expedient narratives and settle old scores.
From our analysis, it is clear that new governments enjoying comfortable majorities 
after critical elections may use TCs instrumentally to apportion blame and capitalise on 
public discontent to achieve the ‘constant end’ of electoral success (Bermeo, 1992). 
Yet all parties acknowledge the pragmatic need to maintain governmental stability as a 
prerequisite of effective decision-making to overcome deep economic crises. In times of 
economic stress, effective governance often necessitates consensus with the opposition 
who may have skeletons in their closets and, thus, prefer to block backward-looking 
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accountability mechanisms. Thus, it seems that realpolitik trumps learning initiatives in 
times of crisis. TCs lose their appeal and utility when they reveal inconvenient truths 
about the parties establishing them. In such contexts, political elites reframe their political 
narratives from backward-looking mechanisms of accountability to forward-looking poli-
cies aimed at resuscitating the economy. In the final analysis, the establishment of eco-
nomic TCs for instrumental reasons, particularly in delayed cases, is merely a continuation 
of electoral politics by other means.
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Notes
1 The empirical material for this article draws on data collected during the early stages of a broader research 
project. We conducted eight pilot interviews, data from five of which are cited herein, with political elites, 
policymakers and other stakeholders who participated in the commissions under investigation.
2 It should be noted that the Greek debt committee continued its operation even after the defection of most 
politicians supporting the commission from SYRIZA. However, after 2015, it had no official mandate, and 
thereby, it could not be considered as a truth commission (TC).
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